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COMMENTARY: FINDING FAULT
WITH "NO FAULT"
Miles J. Zaremski* & David J. Schwartz**
INTRODUCTION
PROFESSOR GRAD INTRODUCES his article with his oft-re-
peated thesis that "the so-called medical malpractice crisis [is] in
reality a crisis of insurance availability." This insurance availability
crisis, Professor Grad asserts, has led to a series of public policy
problems in health care, including rising health care costs and the
practice of defensive medicine. While the precise nature of the cri-
sis is subject to dispute, there is no doubt that liability insurance is
becoming increasingly difficult to obtain in necessary amounts at a
reasonable cost. Contributors to the problem of insurance availabil-
ity include members of the legal and medical professions, the insur-
ance companies, and the public itself. While none accept credit for
the crisis, each participant has its favorite villain.
There are the "greedy" lawyers, who by sheer volume of mal-
practice suits hope to stumble on one or two cases with recoveries
comparable to lottery jackpots-the type of case which can put a
lawyer on financial easy street. While awaiting the enormous judg-
ment, the lawyer is able to pass the time collecting numerous small
awards in the hope of striking it rich. The legal profession counters
that only a small percentage of valid medical negligence claims are
ever filed, and only a small percentage of those result in verdicts of
over one million dollars.1 Moreover, only the threat of a lawsuit
* Partner, Lurie Sklar & Simon, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois. B.S., University of Illinois
(1970); J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law (1973).
** Associated with Lurie Sklar & Simon, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Knox College
(1981); M.A., (1985), J.D. (1985), University of Denver.
1. Only 10 percent of negligent malpractice injuries result in a claim and only 40 per-
cent of claims result in payment. Danzon, An Economic Analysis of the Medical Malpractice
System, 1 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 39, 42 (1983). In 1984 only 401 suits nationwide resulted
in verdicts of over one million dollars, and those suits were not limited to the medical negli-
gence arena. Rosenbaum, The Liability Crisis and How to CoolIt, N.Y. Times, May 27, 1986,
at 23; Wermiel, The Costs of Lawsuits, Growing Ever Larger, Disrupt the Economy, Wall St.
J., May 16, 1986, at 1; Myths About Million-Dollar Settlements, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986, at
18E. While 400 million-dollar verdicts is no small number, in light of the number of suits
nationwide and the premium dollar amount insurance companies collect, those verdicts could
hardly be the pivotal factor causing physician insurance premiums to triple and quadruple.
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provides any present deterrent to shoddy medical practice.
There are also the "greedy" doctors whose average income far
exceeds the average income of lawyers but who plead poverty.
Rather than address such issues as how to provide better care or
how to better police their peers,2 some physicians focus on cost con-
cerns, claiming that malpractice premiums are putting them in the
poor house and causing the cost of health care to skyrocket. In
reality, premiums for physician malpractice insurance have had a
very small effect on doctors' income or their standard of living.3
Then there supposedly are the "greedy" insurance companies
which often have the luxury of sitting back and watching the doc-
tors and lawyers point accusingly at each other.' The insurance
companies claim they cannot afford to continue insuring health care
practitioners due to the vast increase in the frequency and severity
of claims, lawsuits, and judgments. Of course, the insurance com-
panies do not disclose the profits they are earning as they are osten-
sibly being driven out of the market.' Nor do they emphasize their
2. See, e-g., Cowan, MDs, Juries and Peer Review, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 24, 1986, at
17; Strasser, Malpractice: A Crisis of Doctor's Making?, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 16, 1985, at 8.
3. On the average only one to two percent of a physician's salary (six percent for high
risk specialties) is absorbed by the cost of procuring malpractice insurance. See supra note 1;
Kleinfield, The Malpractice Crunch at St. Paul, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, at 4F; Tybor,
AMA's Malpractice Stand Ripped by Lawyers, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 5.
4. A good example of this may be found in Mathewson, The Law: What the Doctors
Ordered, Reader, July 26, 1985, at 10. In that article, the author stated that it is tempting to
view the insurance crisis as a "battle of the titans"-referring to doctors and lawyers but
completely excluding the insurance companies. In Mathewson's words, "You have rich law-
yers versus even richer doctors, and regardless of how they divy up their share of the pie the
rest of us end up with the same sliver." Of course, the insurance companies take a large piece
of the pie also, but on the whole the insurance companies have been successful in their efforts
to keep the public focused on a "lawsuit crisis" rather than an insurance crisis. For discus-
sions of the role of insurance companies in the latest crisis, see Hunter, Taming the Latest
Insurance "Crisis", N.Y. Times, April 13, 1986, at 3C; The Manufactured Crisis: Liability-
Insurance Companies Have Created A Crisis and Dumped It on You, CONSUMER REPORTS,
Aug. 1986, at 544 [hereinafter cited as The Manufactured Crisis]; Strasser, Tort Crisis Focus
Shifts to Insurers, Nat'l L.J., June 9, 1986, at 1; Levin, The Insurance Crisis: Is Blame With
Industry?, Chicago Tribune, June 16, 1986, at 9A.
5. The Insurance Information Institute originally claimed the insurance industry suf-
fered a $5.5 billion loss in 1985. The National Insurance Consumer Organization claimed its
actuarial analysis indicated a $6.6 billlion gain for the insurance industry in 1985. In reply,
the Insurance Information Institute reiterated its claim of a 1985 $5.5 billion operating loss,
but conceded the industry expected to have close to two billion dollars in after-tax income in
1985. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, NADER-HUNTER CHALLENGE ON 1985
PROFirr/Loss IN P/C INDUSTRY (1986); Decker, Insurance Industry Has Transformed Its
Problems Into Tort System Crisis, Chicago Daily L. Bull., April 26, 1986, at 5. It is interest-
ing to note further that casualty insurance stocks soared in 1985 to levels more than twice the
Dow Jones Industrial Average. See Decker, supra. Obviously, many investment analysts
believe the insurance industry is a good place to make a profit.
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poor investment returns due to falling interest rates as contributing
to their reduced profits. Since insurance companies in the past
earned most of their money through premium investments, the re-
cent poor performance of insurance company portfolios plays a sig-
nificant role in the financial position insurance companies have
recently confronted.
Finally, there is the "greedy" public. The structure of our legal
system allows those injured by negligent health care practitioners to
recover damages. Our legal system inherently rewards those who
take greatest advantage of the system by suing for ever larger
awards, using the most skilled attorneys. This, in fact, is the bot-
tom line of the crisis. More people are increasingly willing to sue
and claim ever larger amounts.6 Moreover, these same people com-
prise the juries which award ever greater recoveries. Thus, the cri-
sis is really not one of mere insurance availability; it is a system-
wide crisis of burgeoning litigation which has manifested itself par-
tially in the health care field.
While insurance availability is certainly a problem, the cause of
this problem is rooted in both the litigious nature of American soci-
6. There has been substantial, recent debate over the question whether a crisis in litig-
iousness actually exists. Robert Roper of the National Center for State Courts conducted a
study of court filings in 25 states covering the years 1978 to 1984 and concluded that "a
careful examination of the available data provides no evidence to support the often cited
existence of a 'litigation explosion.'" See Lauter, Report Says Litigation Explosion is a
"Myth", Nat'l L.J., April 28, 1986, at 46; Brill & Lyons, The Not-So-Simple Crisis, THE AM.
LAW., May 1986, at 1; cf. Marvell, There is a Litigation Explosion, Nat'l L.J., May 19, 1986,
at 13.
In a recent advertisement in the New York Times (May 21, 1986, at 10) the Medical
Society of New York stated that the "crisis in New York is not due to a tremendous increase
in the number of suits, but is the result of skyrocketing increases in the amounts being
awarded." Actually, the median jury award over the past 25 years has remained a remarka-
bly constant 20-25 thousand dollars in 1984 dollars. See Hunter, supra note 4.
Whether a litigation crisis actually exists is unclear. Nonetheless, it is quite clear that the
number of million dollar-plus verdicts is increasing at an alarming rate. The first award of
over one million dollars occurred in 1962 and by 1985 there were over 400. See Rosenbaum,
supra note 1; Wermiel, supra note 1. That first million dollar-plus verdict in 1962 was re-
duced by the court to $450,000. In fact, a high proportion of jury awards, particularly those
over one million dollars, are reduced substantially by the courts. See The Manufactured
Crisis, supra note 4, at 545.
While these awards might not threaten insurance company liquidity, the increasing rate of
multi-million dollar verdicts makes actuarial predictions more and more difficult. See Nash,
Are Insurers Caught in a Squeeze or Putting It On?-Calculating Risk is Riskier Business
Now, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1986, at 18E.
Insurance companies have a difficult time projecting what their future losses may be in the
present litigious climate. If they have no rational way of determining costs, how can they
determine what premiums to charge? Insurance carriers must adjust their rates to reflect this
uncertainty. See supra text at part IV.
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ety and a tort system which rewards those who push the system to
its limits. What is the solution to a problem rooted in the founda-
tions of our culture and our free democratic society? Should partial
solutions to particular symptoms, such as the symptom of rising
insurance rates, be undertaken, or should system-wide reform be
considered? Professor Grad's proposition for the development of a
no-fault compensation plan evinces the former approach.
In evaluating Professor Grad's proposed solution to the sympto-
matic crisis of insurance availability, several questions must be con-
sidered. Most important, it must be determined whether a no-fault
plan also provides a solution to the system-wide problem of litig-
iousness or the social ills it has spawned. At minimum, his plan
must reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance. It fails in all
respects. Not only does his no-fault system fail to address the basic
nature of the systemic problem, it also fails to reduce total costs or
to remedy the particular social ills he criticizes as products of the
present "fault-based" insurance system.
I. DETERRENCE
One social ill Professor Grad asserts has resulted from the easy
availability of malpractice insurance is the failure of the tort system
to pose a threat to physicians, thereby abrogating the deterrent
value of the legal system. According to Professor Grad, insurance
protects the physician's assets and therefore does not deter or disci-
pline negligent conduct. He argues that since "the threat of litiga-
tion has not resulted in ... fewer lawsuits," the threat of litigation
must not fulfill an adequate disciplinary function. Contrary to this
reasoning, a reduction in the number of malpractice claims is not
necessarily an indication of increased medical competence. There
are a number of reasons why the rate of filing of malpractice claims
may fluctuate without reflecting a change in the level of physician
competence. For example, an increase in filings may be due to an
increased awareness of consumer rights, an increase in the public's
willingness to sue, or an increase in the incentive to file (higher
awards). As Professor Grad himself recognizes, "[T]he increase of
the number of medical malpractice claims does not apparently bear
a necessary relationship to negligent medical care."
Contrary to Professor Grad's assertion, despite the presence of
insurance, the threat of a lawsuit does have a deterrent effect. A
malpractice suit affects a physician's reputation, self-esteem, and the
future of his practice. The fact that a physician's home is not at risk
1110 [Vol. 36:1107
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does not mean that insurance negates the deterrence or disciplinary
value of malpractice suits.
Professor Grad also argues that the present insurance system
induces the practice of costly and wasteful defensive medicine by
health care providers. He defines defensive medicine as "subjecting
patients to diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, not because they
are necessary for the benefit of the patient, but in order to establish
a litigation-proof chart." Professor Grad is opposed to the practice
of defensive medicine because of the added cost it apparently im-
poses upon the health care industry. However, there is no precise
agreement as to what constitutes defensive medicine. A defensive
procedure by one practitioner may be regarded by another as essen-
tial for the protection of the patient. Thus, defensive medicine re-
ally appears to mean that a doctor keeps more and better records,
orders more diagnostic tests, and makes certain the patient is fully
informed when making treatment decisions. If defensive medicine
means raising the standard of care, regardless of the reasons
prompting it, the threat of litigation apparently does serve as an
inducement to better health care.
Even if the threat of litigation posed no deterrence to poor medi-
cal practice, a point certainly arguable, a no-fault compensation
plan entirely abrogates any notion of deterrence. Under a no-fault
system, the physician would no longer need to fear the glare of pub-
lic scrutiny, the only deterrent in the present system. While it may
be true that there is no empirical evidence equating defensive
medicine with a higher standard of care, a no-fault system which
removes the sole incentive to perform medical services with a
greater degree of diligence is not advisible.
II. STANDARD OF CARE
Perhaps the single greatest flaw with a no-fault compensation
system is the difficulty in determining what constitutes a compensa-
ble injury. If a negligence standard is abandoned, what standard
replaces it? While automobile accidents and work-related injuries
have been the subject of no-fault laws, an injury during the course
of medical treatment is much more difficult to quantify. How does
one know whether an injury is due to the medical treatment (or lack
thereof) or due to the underlying disease? What will be the new
standard of care? What elements will be necessary to establish that
the standard has been met?
Professor Grad articulates alternative solutions. First, he sug-
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gests that a finite list of compensable events may be established. It
has been estimated, however, that "the number of potentially com-
pensable events would be between 75 and 150 times the number of
injuries currently compensated through tort. [However,] because of
the difficulty of distinguishing [a medically caused] injury from any-
thing less than perfect health outcome, the number of claimants
could be much higher."' 7 Aside from the obvious expense of com-
pensating the much greater number of claimants, what happens to
those persons injured during the course of medical treatment whose
injuries are not on the list?
Professor Grad's alternate suggestion is to define compensable
events in very general terms and leave the question whether the in-
jury is treatment-connected to the hearing officer. Once again, the
lack of a defined standard is a problem. How will the hearing of-
ficer determine what is compensable without a uniform standard?
Will the negligence standard creep back in? After all, demonstrat-
ing negligence may become the most practical means of establishing
that an injury is due to medical intervention rather than due to the
underlying illness. Professor Grad has no solution to these ques-
tions. Instead, he concedes the "problem needs to be studied and
worked on."
III. COST SAVINGS
Professor Grad further advocates the use of a no-fault compen-
sation system as a method of saving the substantial cost of litiga-
tion. While it is true that a percentage of the cost of insurance is
used to pay for the litigation process, there is no evidence that a no-
fault compensation scheme will save money. In fact, the contrary is
true. A study conducted by Dr. Don Harper Mills in California
several years ago indicated a no-fault system would cost $800 mil-
lion more than the present system.8 The failure to effect a savings
over the cost of the present system is due to the increased number of
claimants and the consequent cost of administration. Currently, the
system requires that a claimant establish a physician's negligence
prior to obtaining any recovery. Since only an adverse result, rather
than negligence, need be established under a no-fault system, many
more claims would likely be filed.
7. P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY
216 (1985).
8. See Zaremski & Weibel, There Is No Answer to the Medical Malpractice Crisis 6 J.
LEGAL MED. 265 (1985).
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Although Professor Grad asserts that a no-fault system will save
the "friction" cost of proving negligence, even he ultimately recog-
nizes that replacing fault-based insurance will not really achieve any
savings. Rather, it will use cost savings to compensate a greater
number of people. He states, "the primary objective of a compensa-
tion system would be to make payments to as many injured persons
as possible in as substantial amounts as available, by saving the
'transaction' or 'friction' costs." Moreover, the supposed savings of
friction costs could be expended simply through administrative re-
quirements. Thus, the amount presently available for distribution
to injured claimants would be available to pay the many more
claimants under a no-fault plan. In effect, a no-fault system would
act like a cap on awards to injured persons (the same dollars spread
thinner) but without any savings to the health care system. In Pro-
fessor Grad's words, although "assured of some benefits, the injured
person would be compensated under a system of strictly limited
recoveries."
The question of funding is another problem with the no-fault
plan. Various candidates for paying the insurance premiums exist,
such as the health care provider, the consumer, or the state govern-
ment. While the final alternative is, of course, an individual state
decision, it is difficult to envision any savings over the present fault-
based system regardless of how the new system is funded.
IV. THE TRUE CRISIS
In sum, a no-fault system for providers of health care would not
achieve savings over the present cost of health insurance. Neither
would it address the primary problem of an excessively litigious so-
ciety and ever increasing jury verdicts. The present malpractice cri-
sis is really a crisis of the tort law system. Our legal system has no
safeguards against a culture which becomes accustomed to suing for
enormous damages on grounds which years ago would not have led
to suit. The "crisis of insurance availability," as Professor Grad
labels it, is no more than an effect of the crisis of litigiousness in
American culture.
While insurance companies may not yet be going bankrupt pay-
ing very high judgments, insurance carriers are finding it increas-
ingly difficult and sometimes impossible to predict costs, and hence
what premiums to charge. For example, in late March of 1986, a
Chicago woman was awarded $39 million due to the loss of her two
11131986]
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legs,9 and a jury awarded a Philadelphia woman nearly one million
dollars for injuries following a negligently performed CAT scan.
The injuries included intense headaches, breathing difficulties, in-
continence, and the alleged loss of psychic abilities.' ° Anecdotal
evidence may be questionable, and the foregoing examples may be
extreme, but enough anecdotes very likely indicate a trend: multi-
million dollar verdicts are becoming more commonplace. However,
predicting them, together with the number of lawsuits and attend-
ant costs, becomes an actuarial nightmare.
The problem with actuarial predictions is a problem affecting
the entire American tort system, not simply a problem impacting on
doctors. While health care providers may be at the forefront of the
crisis, everyone in our society is confronted with the problem. Pro-
fessionals, such as architects, accountants, and lawyers, are facing
burgeoning insurance premiums due in part to both the increasing
frequency of suits and severity of judgments. Manufacturers, auto-
mobile owners, and even insurance carriers are finding their premi-
ums rising, or, in many instances, their policies being cancelled.
The piecemeal approach to the crisis as advocated by Professor
Grad, which proposes to create special protection for health care
practitioners, is simply not the solution. There is no justification to
afford physicians special treatment for a problem affecting everyone.
If a solution does exist, it must be found in reducing the incentive,
not the right, to sue.
If the outcome of a tort suit were not as potentially lucrative as
it is today, many people would initially refrain from suing. Those
that do sue would settle their claims without being influenced by
the possibility of winning the big verdict. If our society becomes
less litigious and an equilibrium is established for jury verdicts, in-
surers will be able to develop rational actuarial projections, thereby
bringing the accelerating cost of premiums under control.
Some of the suggestions designed to ensure actuarial soundness
and insurance availability currently before many state legislatures
include ceilings on awards for noneconomic damages (e.g., pain and
suffering), abrogation of the collateral source rule, and abolition of
joint and several liability. By reducing the amount of potential re-
covery, these proposals also reduce the incentive to sue.
In a Rand Corporation study of the post-1975 tort reforms," it
9. Cook County Jury Verdict Reporter, Vol. BB, No. 23, March 28, 1986.
10. See THE MANUFACTURED CRISIS, supra note 4, at 546.
11. P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS (1982).
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was found that ceilings on awards and mandatory offset of collateral
compensation had a substantial effect on frequency and severity of
claims and judgments. States enacting a cap were estimated to have
had a nineteen percent lower average severity within two years.12
Mandatory collateral source offset effective for two years was esti-
mated to result in a fifty percent reduction in severity.13
Despite these statistics, Professor Grad has several objections to
tort law changes designed to ensure actuarial soundness and insur-
ance availability. First, he asserts that the "unpredictable character
of malpractice claims raises doubts" whether tort law changes
would be effective. While the character of malpractice claims may
be unpredictable, that is a problem which exists regardless of how
the insurance crisis is approached. Moreover, the unpredictable na-
ture of malpractice claims seems particularly problematic in devel-
oping a no-fault compensation scheme. With reference to no-fault,
however, Professor Grad asserts that "the number of adverse medi-
cal outcomes or medical injuries [may be] finite and.., capable of
specification." If medical injuries are predictable in a no-fault sys-
tem, why are they unpredictable in a fault-based system?
Second, Professor Grad asserts that to reduce the cost of insur-
ance, tort law changes would have to make it more difficult for pa-
tients to recover from physicians, perhaps requiring a patient to
prove gross negligence rather than simple negligence. This is sim-
ply not true. To assure competent actuarial projections, it may be
necessary to make it more difficult for patients (and all tort plain-
tiffs) to recover excessively large judgments, but not necessarily to
recover any judgment. While it is true that award caps for
noneconomic damages are objectionable to some, a no-fault system
would necessitate an even lower cap on awards (including economic
damages) in order to pay all claimants suffering adverse outcomes
not necessarily due to negligence.
V. CONCLUSION
While there is certainly a problem in insurance availability, that
problem is really a part of the greater crisis-the litigious nature of
our society. Consequently, any proposed solution, if it is to have a
hope of success, must address the basic issue of decreasing the in-
centive to sue. A no-fault compensation scheme available only to
physicians fails to accomplish this. Moreover, it fails even in its
12. Id. at vi.
13. Id.
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primary endeavor to reduce the cost of health care. Concomitantly,
a no-fault system removes the disciplinary threat of litigation and
fails to replace it with an incentive to perform at the highest level of
medical competence. The proposed no-fault system fails to identify
a standard of care to which physicians will be held accountable, and
it fails to delineate how to determine compensable outcomes.
In short, a no-fault system of medical insurance is not a viable
solution. Any solution which is to be successful must address the
correct issue. The problem in insurance availability is an effect, not
a cause, of a greater ill in our society. That ill is the eagerness to
sue, as is said in the vernacular, "for everything you've got."
